Corporate Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking the Identity of Anonymous Employee Internet Posters by Reder, Margo E. K. & O\u27Brien, Christine Neylon
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1
2002
Corporate Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe
Defamation Lawsuits Seeking the Identity of
Anonymous Employee Internet Posters
Margo E. K. Reder
Wallace E. Carroll School of Management, Boston College
Christine Neylon O'Brien
Wallace E. Carroll School of Management, Boston College
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Internet Law
Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margo E. Reder & Christine N. O'Brien, Corporate Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking the Identity of




FILE JOHN DOE DEFAMATION LAWSUITS
SEEKING THE IDENTITY OF ANONYMOUS
EMPLOYEE INTERNET POSTERS
Margo E. K. Reder*
Christine Neylon O'Brien**
Cite as: Margo E.K. Reder and Christine Neylon O'Brien, Corporate
Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking
the Identity of Anonymous Employee Internet Posters,
8 MICH. TELECOMM. ICH. L. REV. 195 (2002)
available at http://vww.mttlr.org/voleight/Reder.pdf
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 195
I. D ENDRITE ..................................................................................... 198
I1. DEFAMATION SUITS SEEKING TO UNMASK
ANONYMOUS POSTERS .................................................................. 200
I. ANONYMOUS POSTERS PROTECTED BY
ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION ............................................................ 202
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF ANONYMOUS SPEECH ............ 204
V. PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEE RIGHTS TO
POST ANONYMOUSLY .................................................................... 206
VI. HOW THE INTERNET CHANGES THE RULES .................................. 209
A. Freedom Fighters or Verbal Terrorists ................................. 210
B. Balancing the Equities: Employer Redress, Employee
Speech and the Necessity of Disclosure-Developing
a Standard ............................................................................ 211
C ONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 217
INTRODUCTION
Consider the typical disgruntled employee's complaints: poor work-
ing conditions, bad management, long hours, low pay, limited
opportunities for advancement, and so forth. Ten years ago, employee
dissatisfaction was registered in limited ways-perhaps around the water
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cooler, out in the parking lot, or during meals, conferences, etc. Such
dissatisfaction usually occurred against the backdrop of downward trend-
ing economic conditions or significantly changing industry patterns.
Very infrequently would this dissatisfaction register in publications such
as company or industry newsletters, or in local or national news and
magazine publications. Such complaints would, in this era, reach an au-
dience limited both in scope and geography. In any event, the identity of
the employee was known, or at least easily discoverable, so it was possi-
ble for the employer to serve process and file a complaint for any
allegedly defamatory remarks.
This is a dramatic contrast to today's legal environment.
Communications systems are now wide open and fully accessible, with
no limits in range, scope or geography. Targeted audiences are accessible
with pinpoint accuracy. Messages reach millions of readers with one
click. There is a chat room for everyone.' Most importantly, there is no
limit on content. Therefore, employees can register their dissatisfaction
by posting a message in a chat room. Moreover, the identity of the
posting employee is not easily discoverable due to anonymous and
pseudonymous communications capabilities.2 The nature of these online
messages is qualitatively different from real-world communications. By
way of example, newspapers have a responsibility regarding the veracity
of the content that they print. Sponsors of online bulletin board services
do not bear the same level of responsibility In cyberspace chatrooms,
everyone is a publisher; there are no editors. Online messages reflect
this, too. The culture of online communications is vastly different from
traditional discourse, in that the former tolerates and even encourages the
use of hyperbole, crudeness, acronyms, misspellings, and misuse of
language. It is a fast and loose atmosphere, emphasizing speed rather
than accuracy.
This is the current environment in which anonymous employees post
negative statements about their employers. The questions raised in this
article relate to management's response, in the form of John Doe law-
suits, to this recent spate of negative Internet postings by employees.
1. See http://message.yahoo.com/?action=q&board=DRTE (last visited Jan. 17, 2002)
(posting for a message board for Dendrite International, Inc., discussed infra Part II).
2. E.g., http:/Iwww.anonymizer.comlcorporate/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 18, 2002)
(Anonymizer.com allows a person to navigate the Internet with privacy and anonymity).
3. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-348 (1974) (holding that
newspaper publishers may be liable for defamation) with Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 bars liability
for computer service providers for statements made on its service by a third party).
4. See David L. Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Chal-
lenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3 10-17 (2000), at http://www.vjolt.net/
vol5/symp2000/v5ila3-Sobel.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2001).
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The emergence of the Internet as the medium of choice for such com-
munications raises a myriad of questions that are new to courts.
Questions arise regarding the extent to which employers may control the
speech of current employees or former employees and, as a corollary to
this, the extent to which such speech is protected, as well as whether this
attempted speech control violates public policy. Such suits have just be-
gun to reach the courts, and their resolution will form the contours of
employee freedom of speech in the Internet age. John Doe suits impli-
cate constitutional and common law issues ranging from the First
Amendment to privacy, defamation, breach of employment agreement,
and trade secret laws. Such suits involve statutes as well, including whis-
tleblower protections and Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation ("SLAPP") laws.
Negative postings by employees also correlate to general economic
conditions. During the current two year downturn in the financial mar-
kets, for example, there has been a tremendous increase in such postings.
Employers have just begun to reply to these allegedly defamatory post-
ings-in the form of John Doe lawsuits.' Because it is difficult to discern
who is speaking in cyberspace, plaintiffs often file a lawsuit listing "John
Doe" as the defendant. Plaintiffs then invoke the power of a subpoena to
compel the Internet Service Provider ("ISP") or Bulletin Board Service
("BBS") on which the posting was made to identify the poster, thereby
unmasking these anonymous and pseudonymous individuals. 6 It is worth
noting that plaintiffs have an alternative course of action, in that they
could investigate the postings and discover for themselves who is posting
the messages. It is not clear whether any more effort or expense is in-
volved in this strategy than immediately invoking the assistance-and
the power-of the judicial system. But it is fair to say that involving the
judicial system at this earliest stage is a coercive, and effective, strategy.
Armed with a subpoena-often issued even before a complaint has
been filed-employers serve process on the posters' ISP/BBS directing
them to divulge the identity of the poster. The vast majority of ISPs
comply with such requests routinely and without challenge-and some-
times without the knowledge or consent of the posting subscriber!
Courts are being asked whether they should authorize this expedited pre-
service discovery to establish posters' identities sufficiently such that
they may be served with process in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
5. See Greg Saitz, Walking a Fine Line on Cyber Rights: Dendrite Case at Core of Free
Speech Battle, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 23, 2001, at 1.
6. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Disclosure in Cyber-
space, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 880-83 (2000).
7. See Sobel, supra note 4, at 14.
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I. DENDRITE
The fascinating aspect of pre-litigation subpoena cases is what hap-
pens next. Rather than continue with the lawsuit to test the merits of the
contention that the postings were defamatory, a great number of compa-
nies that invoke the power of the judicial system to unmask the identities
of the posters simply choose to fire the offending employee and drop the
lawsuit. This naturally begs the question: what are the motives of the
plaintiff companies-to be vindicated from the allegedly defamatory
statements, or to silence their critics?'
The recent case of Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe high-
lights this phenomenon.9 The facts of Dendrite were typical of such
cases. Defendants were four individuals who authored numerous mes-
sages posted under fictitious names on Internet message boards devoted
to discussion of Dendrite International [hereinafter "Dendrite"]. The
boards are maintained by Yahoo!, Inc., which refused to release the ac-
tual names of the alleged infringing users without a subpoena. The John
Doe defendants were known only by their user names: John Doe No. 1
as "implementor _extraordinaire;" John Doe No. 2 as "ajcazz;" John Doe
No. 3 as "xxplrr;" and John Doe No. 4 as "gacbar."' John Does 1 and 2
stated in messages that they were current or former employees of Den-
drite. As such, they were under contractual obligation not to disclose
Dendrite's proprietary or confidential information without permission for
a period of two years from their departure, not to induce other employees
to leave Dendrite, and not to engage in activities adverse to Dendrite's
interests." John Does 3 and 4 denied ever working for Dendrite Interna-
tional.
The messages the four John Does posted discussed Dendrite in detail
and the remarks were generally negative. John Doe 1 posted a number of
messages. Dendrite claimed that in one he falsely accused the company
of fraudulent business practices and alleged it had a policy of not paying
bonuses. In another, Dendrite alleged that he claimed certain software
products offered by Dendrite did not actually exist. 2 Dendrite claimed
John Doe 2 posted a message which stated that "upper management has
threatened to fire me and all of my co-workers at least once a week. We
8. See Sobel, supra note 4, at 15-17.
9. Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
2001).
10. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. John Does, No. MRS C-129-00, at 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.,
Nov. 23, 2000) [hereinafter "Dendrite r'] available at http://vww.citizen.org/documents/
dendrite.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2002), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
11. Id. at2.
12. Id. at 2-3.
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work this way daily."' 3 John Doe 3 allegedly posted messages falsely
stating that management was secretly and unsuccessfully "shopping" the
company, and falsely stating that Dendrite had not been honest in its
revenue recognition.14 Finally, Dendrite asserted that John Doe 4 "posted
confidential information on certain accounts within hours of the com-
pany learning such information."'5
The relief Dendrite requested permitted a subpoena to be served on
Yahoo!. Dendrite requested production of documents sufficient to iden-
tify the John Does. Yahoo! refused to release, absent a court order, the
names of the defendants based on the company's privacy policy. That
policy states:
As a general rule, Yahoo! will not disclose any of your person-
ally identifiable information except when we have your
permission or under special circumstances, such as when we be-
lieved in good faith that the law requires it or under the
circumstances described below ... Yahoo! may also disclose
account information in special cases when we have reason to be-
lieve that disclosing this information is necessary to identify,
contact, or bring legal action against someone who may be vio-
lating Yahoo!'s Terms of Service or may be causing injury to...
anyone.., that could be harmed by such activities.
6
Dendrite asserted that individuals have no right to make defamatory
statements, and that it had every right to protect its reputational interests.
The John Does objected to Yahoo!'s release of such information, and
urged that compelled identification interfered with their First Amend-
ment right to anonymously express their opinions.
7
Dendrite sought discovery from Yahoo! as part of an action for
breach of contract (the employment agreements with John Does 1 and
2), breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and misappropriation of trade
secrets against the four defendants. 8 It was alleged the defendants acted
willfully and maliciously, and that their actions posed an immediate and
continuing threat of harm to Dendrite International. The company also
alleged that the postings contained per se defamatory statements, which
falsely accused it and its management of fraudulent business practices. 9
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. John Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 762 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001)
[hereinafter "Dendrite II"].
17. See Dendrite I, supra note 10, at 18.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 1-2.
2001-20021
200 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 8:195
Dendrite further asserted that directly following these postings, there
was a corresponding drop in the market price for shares of its stock."
Dendrite requested that the court enter an order granting it leave to
conduct limited expedited discovery sufficient to identify the defendant
John Does, so that it could serve them with the complaint and obtain an
enforceable remedy.2 In order to identify the defendants, Dendrite
needed to serve a subpoena on Yahoo! for the names, addresses, e-mail
addresses and IP addresses of the defendants.
"As a general rule, discovery proceedings take place only after de-
fendant has been served" with process.2 Courts have made limited
exceptions to this rule, however, permitting pre-service discovery to
learn the identifying facts necessary to permit service on anonymous
defendants.2' Recognizing the posters' legitimate rights of privacy and
free speech, while understanding the rights of victims to receive redress
through the judicial system, courts must carefully evaluate John Doe
lawsuits in order to protect the interests of all parties.24 The discussion at
this point turns to further exploration of the parties, the causes of action,
and defenses to them.
II. DEFAMATION SUITS SEEKING TO
UNMASK ANONYMOUS POSTERS
Employer suits against employees who post messages anonymously
are particularly worrisome because of the potential for extra-judicial ac-
tion on the part of employers. The process is subject to abuse precisely
because of the absence of an adversarial proceeding to determine
whether plaintiffs are entitled to identifying information. In employer-
employee cases, this situation is further exacerbated because of the par-
ties' relationship. Defendants are not merely disgruntled shareholders or
armchair critics; they earn their living in plaintiff's employ. Plaintiffs
therefore wield enormous power over defendants beyond the judicial
pre-service discovery proceeding. For example, plaintiffs in most cases
have the unfettered ability to lower wages, worsen working conditions,
or even fire defendants. Employers may have their reputations at stake,
but corporate critics or whistleblowing employees have a great deal at
20. Id. at 4. Shares of Dendrite stock have traded in the range of 9 1/4-33 9/16 over a 52-
week period, most recently closing at 13. NASDAQ Composite Regular Trading, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 6, 2001, at C6. Dendrite recently authorized a share repurchase plan, perhaps in an effort
to stabilize its share price. WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2001, available at 2001 VL-WSJ 2852846.
21. Dendrite I, supra note 10, at 5.
22. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 FR.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 578.
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stake as well-they risk their livelihood even as they exercise their right
of free speech. Unless the benefits of anonymous speech are somehow
balanced against the potential for its abuse, such lawsuits will have a
deleterious effect on constitutionally protected speech.
In order to silence their employee and investor critics, corporations
have filed lawsuits under a variety of legal theories including defama-
tion, trademark infringement, breach of confidentiality agreements and
trade secrets, and tortious interference with contractual relations.25 The
theory most commonly used is defamation.
Generally, a cause of action for defamation in cyberspace consists of
a published statement that libels the plaintiff and causes damage. The
truth of the statement is an affirmative defense to a defamation action.
Suits may also be defended based upon evidence that the published
statements were merely hyperbole or opinion. 6 Differing standards
based on the status of plaintiffs have developed to discern whether there
is an actionable claim. For example, if the plaintiff is a private figure, he
or she must prove only negligent publication of the false statement.27 If
the plaintiff in the defamation action is a public figure or public official,
however, there is a requirement of actual malice in the publication of the
statement. The current rule regarding defamation of public figures is
based on the United States Supreme Court decision in New York imes
Co. v. Sullivan.z There the Court held that a plaintiff who is a "public
official" might succeed in a defamation action only if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice.' 29
Actual malice is having knowledge that a statement is false or exhibiting
a reckless disregard for whether the statement is false or not.30
Additionally, the "public figure" constitutional protection extension
comes from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 In Gertz, the United States Su-
preme Court stated that the public figure designation arises when a
person is a general or limited purpose public figure.32 General-purpose
public figures are individuals who have obtained such pervasive fame or
notoriety that they become public figures for all purposes and in all con-
texts. Alternatively, limited-purpose public figures are only public
figures for a limited range of issues surrounding a particular public
25. See Bruce . Smith, Cybersmearing and the Problem of Anonymous Online Speech,
18 J. MEDIA, INFO., & CoiMt. L. 3, 5 (Fall 2000).
26. See id. at 7-8.
27. See Jeffrey R. Elkin, Cybersmears: Dealing With Defamation on the Net, Bus. L. To-
DAY, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 22.
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Id. at 279-80.
30. ld. at 280.
31. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Id. at 351.
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controversy.33 It is much easier for a defendant to defeat a defamation
claim when the plaintiff is a public official or public figure than when
the plaintiff is a private individual.' A judge decides whether a plaintiff
is a public official or figure, and each case is fact-specific.35
A new trend appears to be emerging in defamation cases at the lower
court level involving anonymous speakers and writers. When faced with
defamation lawsuits against anonymous posters, courts seem to be ques-
tioning whether these suits are brought for meritorious reasons or merely
to unmask the posters, so that they may be silenced or terminated. The
chilling effect of defamation suits and the accompanying discovery,
which matches real names with pseudonyms, is perhaps the greatest
where the plaintiff employs the posters. In addition, even anonymous
investors posting messages may seek protection from unmasking pursu-
ant to the theories afforded in late-breaking decisions.
111. ANONYMOUS POSTERS PROTECTED BY
ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION
In a recent case, Global Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe I,6 a
federal court held that California's Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation ("SLAPP") statute should be applied to anonymous post-
ings on an Internet message board.37 In Global Telemedia, the plaintiffs
brought suit against numerous John Does, including King and Reader,
for posting anonymous negative comments about Global Telemedia In-
ternational, Inc. ("GTMI") and Jonathan Bentley Stevens, then CEO of
GTMI, on an Internet message board.38 The plaintiffs brought multiple
actions against the defendants including trade libel, libel per se, and in-
terference with contractual relations.39 The defendants argued that
California's statute allowing defendants to dismiss SLAPP suits was ap-
plicable to the case.40 This was a significant victory for the defendants,
33. See Elkin, supra note 27, at 24 (interpreting the language of Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
34. See generally Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84
VA. L. REv. 477, 477, 500 n.182 (1998) (discussing the higher standard of actual malice for
public figures is "almost impossible" to meet).
35. See Elkin, supra note 27, at 24 (citing WFAA-T.V., Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d
568, 571 (Tex. 1998)).
36. 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
37. Id. at 1266. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Name Games: E*Trade Sues Over Postings,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2001, at C1 (quoting attorney for the defense, Megan E. Gray, claiming
the case "has broad implications" as the ruling extends the contexts in which posting are pro-
tected).
38. Global Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1263-64.
39. Id. at 1264.
40. Id. at 1265 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2001)).
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one that will likely result in more use of this new legal defense when
plaintiff companies bring suit against anonymous Internet message board
posters.
California's anti-SLAPP legislation, passed in 1992, was intended to
prevent the chilling of the exercise of constitutional rights such as free
speech through litigation or forms of harassment through the court sys-
tem.4' The Global Telemedia case extended the protection of the anti-
SLAPP statute to shield anonymous message board posters who criticize
public corporations against questionable lawsuits brought by the corpo-
ration for alleged defamatory statements. The anti-SLAPP legislation
"permits a defendant to dismiss a lawsuit if the alleged bad acts arose
from his or her exercise of free speech 'in connection with a public is-
sue' and if the plaintiff cannot show a probability of success on the
claims'
42
In the suit brought by GTMI and others, the plaintiffs did not contest
that the defendants were exercising their rights of free speech when post-
ing the negative comments or that the Internet message board was a
public forum.43 Instead, plaintiffs argued that the defendants engaged in
defamatory commercial speech that was not of public interest.4 The
United States District Court, however, held that the plaintiff's interpreta-
tion of the anti-SLAPP statute was too narrow. The court found that the
anti-SLAPP provision protected even commercial speech and recognized
it as a form of free speech.45 The Global Telemedia Court noted, how-
ever, that precedent established in Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan
Computer Group prevented a business competitor from using the anti-
SLAPP statute to protect commercial speech.46 But because neither de-
fendant was a business competitor of the plaintiffs, the postings were
viewed by the court as an exercise of the defendants' right of free
speech, albeit commercial in nature.47
The Global Telemedia Court interpreted Section 425.16 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure not only to require comments to be an
exercise of the defendants' right of free speech, but also to connect the
comments with a public issue4' The court found that GTMI was of pub-
lic interest because it is a publicly traded company with 18,000 investors,
41. Id. at 1264-65.
42. Id. at 1265 (quoting CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001)).
43. Id. at 1265.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1265-66.
46. Id. (citing Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127,
1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
47. Id. at 1266.
48. Id. at 1265.
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it uses the media to distribute good news about the company to be attrac-
tive to investors, and GTMI has been the target of more than 30,000
Internet postings.49
The court essentially extended anti-SLAPP protection to cyberspace
and anonymous Internet posters by ruling that the defendants satisfied
the free speech and public concern requirements of the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute.50 The Global Telemedia ruling will likely have a significant impact
on these "cyber-SLAPP" cases because twelve other states, in addition to
California, have anti-SLAPP laws, including Colorado, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, and Tennessee.5' Ten other states have been reportedly
contemplating anti-SLAPP legislation. 2
It should be noted that California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16
still provides the plaintiff the opportunity to overcome an anti-SLAPP
defense if it is able to demonstrate a probability of success. 3 In the
Global Telemedia case, the plaintiffs could not convince the court that
they would likely prevail on their claims against the defendants." The
court found that the defamation actions against the defendants would be
unsuccessful because the postings were opinions rather than facts, and
that even if the comments were found to be factual, the plaintiffs suf-
fered no harm by the defendants' comments.5
In Global Telemedia, the defendants were able to apply California's
anti-SLAPP legislation to successfully defend against GTMI's numerous
causes of action. The court granted a motion to dismiss prior to discov-
ery of the identities of the posters, thus defeating the plaintiff's lawsuit,
and thereby preventing what has become a common method for corpora-
tions to expose and silence anonymous critics on Internet message
boards.56
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF ANONYMOUS SPEECH
First Amendment protection for public speech made by anonymous
persons was explicitly recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.5 ' The McIntyre Court ruled that
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1265-66.
51. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 945 n.506.
52. Id.
53. Global Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
54. Id. at 1270-71.
55. Id. at 1267-70.
56. See id. at 1270-71.
57. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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anonymous opinion about public issues or concerns is protected speech
under the First Amendment. 8 The McIntyre case involved an action by
the deceased pamphleteer's executor, Joseph McIntyre, who continued to
pursue the matter upon the death of pamphleteer Margaret McIntyre.5 9
Mr. McIntyre challenged the fine imposed on Ms. McIntyre by the Ohio
Elections Commission for distributing anonymous leaflets opposing a
proposed school tax levy.60
The question presented in McIntyre was whether an Ohio statute that
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridged
an individual's freedom of speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment.6' The Court held that "the anonymity of an author is not
ordinarily a sufficient reason to exclude her work product from the pro-
tections of the First Amendment.' 62 Referring to literary works, the Court
stated that "[tihe decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by
fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostra-
cism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as
possible?' 3 The Court, however, citing Talley v. California,64 stated that
"It]he freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the literary
realm. In Talley, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the
distribution of unsigned handbills urging readers to boycott certain Los
Angeles merchants who were allegedly engaging in discriminatory em-
ployment practices. "'
The Talley Court rejected the argument that a similar ordinance was
"aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false
advertising and libel"6' 6 because "nothing in the text or legislative history
of the ordinance limited its application to those evils "'67 Likewise in
McIntyre, the state statute contained no language limiting its application
to fraudulent, false or libelous statements. Therefore, to the extent that
Ohio sought to justify its statute "as a means to prevent the dissemina-
tion of untruths, its defense ... [failed] for the same reason given in
Talley"'6"
Nevertheless, the McIntyre Court distinguished the statute in Talley
from the Ohio statute because the Ohio statute applied only to unsigned
58. Id. at 357.
59. Id. at 340.
60. Id. at 337-38.
61. Id. at 336.
62. Id. at 341.
63. Id. at 341-42.
64. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
65. Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
66. Id. at 343 (quoting Talley, 362 U.S. at 64).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 344.
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documents designed to influence voters in an election, while the Los
Angeles statute at issue in Talley "prohibited all anonymous handbilling
'in any place under any circumstances."'69 The McIntyre Court held that
the Ohio statutory prohibition against the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature violated the First Amendment' 0 The Court declared
that the State "cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by indiscriminately
outlawing a category of speech, based on its content, with no necessary
relationship to the danger sought to be prevented."
71
V. PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEE RIGHTS TO POST ANONYMOUSLY
It is clear that First Amendment free speech rights protect against
government action.72 But what of private employer action or reaction to
anonymous postings where the posters turn out to be employees? What
free speech rights do private sector employees have? Are private sector
employers restricted from silencing their employees by the federal Con-
stitution in the same manner as public sector employersf 3 The rights of
private sector employees to speak their minds, even on their own time,
and on their own computers, may be noticeably chilled by fear of em-
ployer retaliation.
For the most part, employers in the private sector retain the power to
hire, fire, and discipline employees in accordance with the employer's
legitimate business interest. One such interest is an employer's interest in
protecting its reputation. Even where a matter may be of public concern,
and about a company that has sought the media to enhance its image.,
that company may wish to discover the disseminator of statements that
cast it in an unfavorable light. Employees are perhaps more likely to
have and express such opinions about their employer than about other
companies with which they are far less familiar. Examining these com-
peting interests, several questions arise. If employees express their
opinions online about publicly disclosed information, is this an offense
69. Id. (quoting Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61).
70. Id. at 357.
71. Id.
72. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE & OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE 164 (1999).
73. See DAVID P. TWo~mY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 614-15 (11 th ed. 2001) (citing
K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984). See also watchtower Bible and
Tract Society, Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001) cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 392
(2001). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Feb. 26, 2002 in this case. The Court is
considering the level of protection that is due for anonymous nonpolitical speech-in this case
speech of a religious nature- and whether this speech deserves the same high level of protec-
tion that anonymous political speech enjoys, as established by the McIntyre decision. 514 U.S.
334, 336 (1995). The decision in Watchtower thus will impact speech of an anonymous
nonpolitical nature, such as that considered in cybersmear cases.
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for which they may be disciplined or discharged?74 Or does the opinion
privilege of the First Amendment protect derogatory employee posters?
Should the courts look at private sector employee postings differently in
light of the constraints placed upon employees within the employment
relationship?75
The use of technology itself to disseminate messages poses other dif-
ficult issues courts may need to resolve on the way to resolving the
previous questions. Should computer postings be treated differently than
the more traditional avenues of expression afforded by newspapers,
newsletters, or handbills? Should the greater reach of language in cyber-
space result in equating such publications with radio or television
broadcast? To the extent that Internet bulletin boards are loose forums
where posters may aim to inflame the audience and proudly strut un-
founded opinions, the context is unlike ordinary communication media.
So long as anonymity reigns, an employee poster suffers no harm for his
or her derogatory postings regarding the employer. But if a plaintiff em-
ployer establishes a probability of success on the merits of its defamation
claim and discovers the poster's identity, where will the private sector
employee look for protection? Perhaps the employee might look for
guidance to the common law public policy and explicit statutory protec-
tions afforded employee speech in other situations. The regulatory
environment of employment sets some boundaries in other contexts that
may apply to employee posters as well.
Employees have a federal right to engage in "concerted activity"
within the meaning of Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Acte6
and this protection applies whether or not the employees are unionized.77
74. It is a completely different matter if an employee discloses private proprietary infor-
mation, trade secrets, or breaches a duty of confidentiality in violation of an employment
agreement while discussing company activities online. These cases do not compare with an
employee writing about publicly disclosed information and/or to instances where there is no
violation of an express employment agreement. Beyond contractual prohibitions, one might
also consider an agent's duties of loyalty, good faith, and the duty to inform the principal of all
relevant information, etc., to the extent that such duties apply in an employment context where
the employer is the principal and the employee is the agent. See Immunomedies, Inc. v. Jean
Doe, 775 A.2d 773, 777-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("Individuals choosing to harm
another or violate an agreement through speech on the Internet cannot hope to shield their
identity and avoid punishment through invocation of the First Amendment.").
75. See TWomEY, supra note 73, at 623 (noting that employers may monitor employee e-
mail under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act); see also Michael J. McCarthy, Web-
surfers Beware: The Company Tech May be a Secret Agent, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2000, atAl
(discussing the ease with which a company may monitor its employees' Internet traffic).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
77. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
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Even with this right, however, employers retain the ability to limit em-
ployee speech that interferes with work activity during working hours, as
long as "concerted activity" speech is not limited any more than other
forms of speech that interfere with work and occur during working
hours.7" Employer rules regulating speech must not discriminate against
employees who choose to form or to join a union, or who engage in dis-
cussion for mutual aid and protection, lest the employer run afoul of
statutory protections afforded to employees.
Other areas where employer regulation of employee speech may
conflict with employee rights include interference with such protected
activities as whistleblowing.79 Employees may be anxious to discuss per-
ceived serious safety conditions or illegal activities. But once again, is
posting such information on a computer bulletin board the appropriate
route for seeking its correction? Still, further issues arise regarding em-
ployee postings that relate to religion, gender, disability, sexual
orientation, etc. To the extent that both federal and state laws protect
employees from discrimination on these bases, employers who allow
online harassment of its employees by other employees may be held li-
able for their failure to intervene."0
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). However, the supervisory and managerial employees are not included
within the protections afforded employees by the National Labor Relations Act. See National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974).
78. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to set different, more restrictive stan-
dards for policing "concerted activity" than other non-productive or non-work activity. This
amounts to discrimination on the basis of a protected activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3)
(1994). Rules similar to those applied in the concerted activity context in traditional modes of
communication should apply in cyberspace. As scholars have noted, "[d]enial of access to
electronic communication networks ... will likely work a greater interference with employ-
ees' rights to engage in concerted activities than will denial of access to a workplace's physical
plant:' Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyber-
space: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 63 (2000).
79. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistle-
blower Protection, 38 At. Bus. L.J. 99, 100, 130 (2000) (discussing whistleblowing
exception to the doctrine of employment at will and noting the enactment of whistleblower
protection statutes in fifty states).
80. See Mark E. Schreiber, Employer E-Mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and
Investigations, 85 MAss. L. Rv. 74, 76-77 (2000) (noting employer liability for improper or
offensive e-mail or web traffic in race and sexual harassment cases); See also Gerald L.
Maatman, Jr., Cyberspace Harassment, 2 J. Emp. DISCRIMINATION. L. 286, 287-88 (2000)
(discussing employer liability for e-mail postings on Internet bulletin board constituting work-
place sexual harassment where employer failed to remedy); cf. Schreiber, supra, at 80 (stating
that federal law restricts employer liability for defamation to cases where "the employee acts
within the scope of his employment and the employer either had knowledge of, ratified, or
recklessly disregarded such conduct').
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Employees may have protection to voice their opinions between
each other regarding numerous matters, but their rights must be balanced
against the needs of others, both within the workplace and outside of it.
In the cyber era, managers retain significant managerial prerogative to
limit employee speech. Errant speech may prove costly to employees if
employers succeed in unmasking them as anonymous posters. While the
right to speak anonymously is constitutionally protected, that protection
is not without limits. The laws of defamation remain available to pursue
employees who post false statements of fact about the company or its
principals. Even if the company is a "public" concern or the managers
are "public figures," there may well be a basis for a court to find that
such facts were posted with "actual malice" or "reckless disregard for
truth or falsity." There may also be a basis in contract and tort to disci-
pline or discharge employees, and to seek monetary damages and an
injunction against further postings. This could occur where online post-
ings breach confidentiality or restrictive employment covenants, or
where the postings divulge trade secrets or otherwise violate what con-
stitutes a well-recognized fiduciary or agency duty to the employer.
VI. How THE INTERNET CHANGES THE RULES
Several John Doe cases have been filed recently, corresponding to an
increase in anonymous and pseudonymous participation in Internet chat
rooms.8 This phenomenon is due to the attributes and architecture of the
Internet. Available at little or no cost, with instant access to an audience
of unprecedented reach, and without any sponsor or filter to evaluate the
content of posters' speech, the Internet is the most powerful communica-
tions medium ever. Employees' speech, which previously had a relatively
limited effect on employers, now has the potential scope and impact of a
broadcast on the evening news, and then some.
An interesting point to consider in these cases is the juxtaposition of
12the parties. Prior to the advent of the Internet as a medium of commu-
nication, publishers were invariably large organizational entities. While
it is publishers who are still being sued for libel, it is no longer necessar-
ily the New York Times, Hustler or the National Enquirer, to name just a
81. See Carl Kaplan, Virginia Court's Decision in Online 'John Doe' Case Hailed by
Free-Speech Advocates, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Mar. 16, 2001, available at http:fl
courses.cs.vt.edu/-cs3064/lib/Freedom.of.Speech/Anonymous.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2001) (citing experts' estimate that more than 120 companies have filed Doe suits); Anne
Colden, Sending a Message, Companies Go to Court to Stop 'Cyber-Smearers; DENV. POST,
Jan. 15, 2001, at E-01 (citing the increase in such suits and estimating that the filings exceed
100 in number).
82. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 893-95.
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few well-known libel defendants. Now, one anonymous and pseudony-
mous individual, because of the Internet, has nearly the same publishing
power that a large organization possesses. And the typical plaintiffs in
Internet libel cases are now the large organizations. This role reversal
changes the nature of the discussion, and suggests that perhaps the his-
torical paradigms of libel and speech are not entirely applicable to
cyberspace.
A. Freedom Fighters or Verbal Terrorists
Because publishing has never been easier, cheaper, or more targeted,
disgruntled posters' messages have found an audience. Employees main-
tain that they are just expressing their opinion, even the most audacious
of which is protected by the First Amendment; that the First Amendment
protects anonymous speech; and that anonymous speech fosters free ex-
pression. Employers counter that these employees are not freedom
fighters, but rather, verbal terrorists who irresponsibly and frivolously
defame and libel employers and then hide behind the veil of anonymity
and the perceived protections of the First Amendment. 3 But the First
Amendment, employers point out, does not protect libelous speech.'
The shroud of anonymity combined with the qualitatively different
manner of expression prevalent on the Internet is the great divider be-
tween online and offline libel cases. For all of the value in the
constitutional protection of anonymous speech,85 it must, nevertheless, be
acknowledged that anonymity has the potential to conceal illegal activ-
ity. 6 Therefore, an individual may not extend the protection of his or her
speech under the First Amendment to violations of the law simply by
choosing to remain anonymous." It is imperative, however, that em-
ployer suits attempting to strip employees of their anonymity are most
carefully evaluated. How then do courts address these important issues in
the context of pre-litigation subpoena cases?
83. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 945 (concluding that "many plaintiffs will have legiti-
mate claims against aggressively uncivil and vicious speakers whose only intent is to destroy
the reputation of their targets:').
84. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (holding that libelous state-
ments are outside the realm of constitutionally protected speech).
85. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42, 357 (1995).
86. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 ER.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
("With the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious acts, such as
defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement, entirely on-line. The tortfea-
sor can act pseudonymously or anonymously and may give fictitious or incomplete identifying
information.").
87. Id. ("People are permitted to interact pseudonymously and anonymously with each
other so long as those acts are not in violation of the law" [emphasis added]).
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B. Balancing the Equities: Employer Redress, Employee Speech
and the Necessity of Disclosure-Developing a Standard
In John Doe defamation cases courts must decide whether to order
the identification of an anonymous Internet poster against whom an ac-
tion has been filed, or to allow the individual to remain anonymous.
Courts must discern whether the plaintiff has supportable claims and
whether the law supports immunity for the posters. Moreover, all of this
has to be accomplished even before the complaint has been served and
litigation truly begins. The tension involved in cybersmear lawsuits be-
tween anonymity and accountability has analogies in privacy and First
Amendment jurisprudence, and of course in anti-SLAPP litigation. 8'
Courts have recognized a qualified privilege against disclosure in cases
where disclosure would harm the exercise of a fundamental right. 9 How
courts have resolved these matters in such contexts is instructive with
regard to John Doe cybersmear suits.
Two approaches to pre-subpoena litigation have developed in court
decisions beginning in 2000. The first court to issue an opinion on this
issue was a Virginia state court, in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum To
America Online, Inc.9" The court considered the issue in the context of an
ISP challenging a plaintiff's attempts to unmask anonymous posters who
subscribed to AOL's service. AOL moved to quash a subpoena issued in
support of plaintiff's discovery.9' Plaintiff, an anonymous publicly traded
company ("APTC"), wished to ascertain who was posting allegedly de-
famatory material misrepresentations and confidential information about
its company. AOL responded that it was unwilling to voluntarily comply
with the subpoena. The court framed the issue as follows:
As this Court has determined that the subpoena can have an op-
pressive effect on AOL, the sole question remaining is whether
the subject subpoena is unreasonable in light of all the surround-
ing circumstances. Ultimately, this Court's ruling ... must be
governed by a determination of whether the issuance of the sub-
poena duces tecum and the potential loss of the anonymity of the
John Does, would constitute an unreasonable intrusion on their
First Amendment rights. In broader terms, the issue can be
framed as whether a state's interest in protecting its citizens
88. See Global Telemedia Intern., Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264-66 (C.D.
Cal. 2001).
89. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
90. 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. America Online,
Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
91. Id. at 27.
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against potentially actionable communications on the Internet is
sufficient to outweigh the right to anonymously speak on this
ever-expanding medium. There appear to be no published opin-
ions addressing this issue either in the Commonwealth of
Virginia or any of its sister states.'
AOL proposed that the Court adopt a two-prong test to determine
when a subpoena request is reasonable and would require it to identify
its subscribers: (1) the plaintiff must plead with specificity a prima facie
claim that it is the victim of recognized tortious conduct and (2) the sub-
poenaed information must be centrally needed to advance that claim. 3
Finding AOL's proposed test "too cumbersome" (in that courts would be
asked to determine the sufficiency of pleadings, which vary from state to
state), the Court instead created this rule:
when a subpoena is challenged .... a court should only order...
[an ISP] to provide information concerning the identity of a sub-
scriber (1) when the court is satisfied by the pleadings or
evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party requesting the
subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it
may be the victim of [actionable] conduct ... and (3) the sub-
poenaed identity information is centrally needed to advance that
claim.94
The Court denied AOL's motion to quash, finding that under its new
test, all three prongs had been satisfied as to the identities of the AOL
subscribers. The anonymous posters were ordered unmasked. The court
found that the "compelling state interest in protecting companies such as
APTC from the potentially severe consequences that could easily flow
from actionable communications ... significantly outweigh the limited
intrusion on the First Amendment rights of any innocent subscribers."9'
Also in 2000, a New Jersey state trial court heard the Dendrite96
case. This case arose in the context of anonymous posters themselves
challenging plaintiff's attempts to unmask them. Acknowledging the
Virginia state court's decision in AOL, as well as the Northern District of
California's opinion in Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,97 a federal
trademark case, the court adopted the approach taken by the latter
92. Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 36.
94. Id. at 37.
95. Id. at 37.
96. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. John Does, No. MRS C-129-00, (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Nov.
23, 2000) available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/dendrite.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2002), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001).
97. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 ER.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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court." Seescandy com arose in a different context, a domain name dis-
pute. Nevertheless, the case involved a plaintiff seeking to unmask
anonymous defendants prior to service of process. That court was asked
to grant a temporary restraining order ("TRO") without knowing the
identity of the defendant whom plaintiff had not yet located." The
court's ruling focused solely on the procedural propriety of allowing pre-
service discovery. The court considered whether it should authorize dis-
covery to establish the defendants' identities sufficiently such that they
could be served with process,"° noting that:
[a]s a general rule, discovery proceedings take place only after
the defendant has been served; however, in rare cases, courts
have made exceptions, permitting limited discovery to ensue af-
ter filing of the complaint to permit the plaintiff to learn the
identifying facts necessary to permit service on the defendant.'
Specifically in reference to anonymous online speech, the court
added:
People are permitted to interact pseudonymously and anony-
mously with each other so long as those acts are not in violation
of the law.... People who have committed no wrong should be
able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes
to harass or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and
thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their
identity.
02
Mindful that the traditional reluctance to permit Doe filings (because
they do not comply with service requirements) must be tempered by the
need to provide injured parties with a forum, the Seescandy.com Court
enunciated a four-prong test to determine whether discovery to uncover
the identity of a defendant is warranted. First, the plaintiff must identify
the defendant with sufficient specificity. Second, the plaintiff must iden-
tify all previous steps taken to locate the defendant (thus evidencing a
good faith effort to comply with service of process requirements). Third,
the plaintiff must establish that its suit can withstand a motion to dis-
miss. Fourth, the plaintiff must file a request for discovery, along with a
statement of justifications for this request, as well as the identification of
a limited number of persons or entities on whom discovery process
might be served-and for which there is a reasonable likelihood that this
98. Dendrite I, supra note 96, at 6-7.
99. Seescandycom, 185 F.R.D. at 575.
100. Id. at 577.
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 578.
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discovery will lead to identifying information that would make service of
process possible.' 3
The Dendrite Court, citing New Jersey's commitment to maintaining
the anonymity of individuals in specific situations, adopted the test of
Seescandy.com and required Dendrite International to satisfy it "before
the Court will impinge upon a defendant's Constitutional Right to Free
Speech " ' This first Dendrite opinion, issued November 23, 2000, is a
landmark decision on the rights of individuals to communicate anony-
mously and pseudonymously on the Internet about matters of public
concern.' 5 (The court did not issue a decision with regard to John Does 1
and 2, as they did not respond in this case. Because of this, the court
granted Dendrite's request as to those two defendants.)'" John Does 3
and 4 engaged counsel immediately to challenge Dendrite's efforts to
unmask them. As to these defendants, the court refused to grant Den-
drite's pre-service subpoena motion. 7 Significantly, the court imposed a
burden of proof higher than that usually required for a motion to dismiss.
Because of this more searching review, the court found that Dendrite did
not make out a prima facie case of defamation against John Doe 3. Fur-
ther, the court found that the company failed to provide the Court with
"ample proof from which to conclude that John Does Nos. 3 and 4 have
used their constitutional protections in order to conduct themselves in a
manner which is unlawful or that would warrant this Court to revoke
their constitutional protections.'0  Dendrite appealed the decision to the
Superior Court of New Jersey.
On review, a three-judge panel considered Dendrite's contention that
the court should compel identity disclosure.'O4 The court noted that the
present case focused on John Doe No. 3's comments as the basis for
Dendrite's defamation claims." Reviewing the Seescandy.com approach,
103. Id. at 578-80.
104. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. John Does, No. MRS C-129-00, at 8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.,
Nov. 23, 2000) available at http:/lwww.citizen.orgldocumentsldendrite.pdf (last visited Jan.
21, 2002), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001).
105. See Mary P. Gallagher, Cybersmearer Defendants Can Keep Anonymity by Appear-
ing in Court: Ruling Breaks New Ground in Litigation over Online Defamation, N.J.L.J., Dec.
4, 2000, at 7 (reporting that this was a case of first impression, and noting Paul Levy's com-
ments that this "decision marks the first time that a judge has rejected a request for
identification"). See generally Saitz, supra note 5 (reporting that this state court decision was
"only the second time in the country in which a judge sided with unnamed message posters
after balancing their constitutional rights against the merits of a defamation suit").
106. Dendrite I, supra note 104, at 22.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Dendrite Int'l Inc. v. John Doe 3,775 A. 2d 756,759-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
2001).
110. Id. at 760.
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the appellate court affirmed the analysis, with some refinements.' The
essential issue on appeal related to the third prong of analysis, wherein
plaintiff must establish that its suit could withstand a motion to dis-
miss."' Dendrite alleged on appeal that it did just that, and that the lower
court substituted a higher, more searching standard in this regard, in con-
travention of recognized standards for motions to dismiss."' The lower
court found, under this more exacting standard, that Dendrite failed to
show that the statements posted by John Doe No. 3 caused any harm to
Dendrite."4 However, the Dendrite complaint would withstand a motion
to dismiss under the normal, less-exacting standard.
Finding that the lower court did indeed require more "evidentiary
support for the pleading than is traditionally required when applying mo-
tion-to-dismiss standards," ' the appellate court nevertheless affirmed
the decision. The court reasoned that this easy-to-meet "standard in iso-
lation fails to provide a basis for analysis and balancing of Dendrite's
request for disclosure in light of John Doe No. 3's competing right of
anonymity in the exercise of his right to free speech.""16 The Superior
Court agreed that such use of the judicial process, in relation to the im-
portant rights involved, necessitated reliance on a higher standard
analogous to the probable cause standard used in criminal investiga-
tions."7 In effect, the probable cause standard required Dendrite to
"make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability actually oc-
curred and that the discovery is aimed at tevealing specific identifying
features of the person or entity who committed the act."'
Along with its reliance on Seescandy.com, the court found support
for its more exacting standard in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum To Amer-
ica Online, Inc."' Applying this higher standard to the case of John Doe
No. 3, the Dendrite court affirmed the denial of Dendrite's motion. The
court concluded that Dendrite failed to demonstrate that Doe No. 3's
postings caused any harm.' A review of the testimony, trading history of
111. Id. at 760-61.
112. Id. at 766.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 769.
116. Id. at 770.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 ER.D. 573, 580 (N.D. Cal.
1999)).
119. 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. America Online,
Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
120. Dendrite II, 775 A.2d at 771-72.
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Dendrite shares, and other news failed to reveal a connection between
John Doe No. 3's actions and any harm to Dendrite International.1
2'
The Superior Court enunciated the following test to determine if,
and when, to compel identity disclosure. The trial court must: (1) require
plaintiff to first undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that
they are the subject of a subpoena; (2) require plaintiff to identify and set
forth the exact statements purportedly made by the anonymous posters
that allegedly constitute actionable speech." Thus, plaintiff must set
forth a prima facie cause of action (which is a more demanding standard
than that generally required for a complaint). Finally, (3) assuming there
is a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the defendant's
First Amendment rights of anonymous free speech against the strength
of plaintiff's case and the necessity for the disclosure of defendant's
identity (so as to allow plaintiff to properly proceed).1
3
The New Jersey Superior Court opinion provides much needed guid-
ance in a new area of law. The court artfully navigated the many
explosive issues and compelling needs of the parties and calibrated their
relative rights and responsibilities. John Doe No. 3 prevailed in the case.
Interestingly, the court took action on a similar case the same day, with
an opposite outcome.
Plaintiffs prevailed in the companion case, Immunomedics, Inc. v.
Jean Doe. 24 This case arose in the context of a defendant employee who
breached a confidentiality agreement with her employer through anony-
mous postings.2' The plaintiff employer sought to compel identity
disclosure. Applying the same analytical framework as in Dendrite, the
court in this instance affirmed identity disclosure of the anonymous
poster. 126 The difference in Immunomedics was that the company met all
conditions under the three-part test, so the court struck the balance in
favor of disclosure.'27 The evidence demonstrated the poster was an em-
ployee, that she executed a confidentiality agreement, and that the
contents of the messages provided evidence of a breach of the agree-
ment.1 28 The court warned that although anonymous speech is protected,
there must be an avenue of redress for those who are wronged. 9 Indi-
viduals cannot avoid punishment through invocation of the First
121. Id. at 772.
122. Id. at 760.
123. Id. at 760-61.
124. 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2001).
125. Id. at 774.
126. Id. at 777-78.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 777.
129. Id. at 777-78.
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Amendment.'3 The contrasting outcomes of Dendrite and Immunomed-
ics are instructive for sorting out identity disclosure claims in the future.
These cases represent an excellent foundation for the developing juris-
prudence of compelling identity disclosure of anonymous posters
through pre-subpoena discovery and litigation.
CONCLUSION
This is indeed a wide-open area of state law. As a result, it is almost
impossible to establish a consistent framework of analysis for anony-
mous Internet speech cases. A patchwork of differing standards by
which to judge these cases undercuts one of the cardinal values of the
law-predictability.
Anonymous and pseudonymous individuals-actually, all individu-
als have a reasonable expectation of privacy and a right to speak
anonymously. Speech and privacy are fragile, especially in instances
when the speech concerns terms of employment or working conditions.
No rights are granted without limitation, however, and speech and pri-
vacy are no exceptions. These rights must be protected, but those who
commit defamation must also be accountable for their actions. The law is
rapidly developing with regard to cybersmear and cyber-SLAPP litiga-
tion in which plaintiffs are invoking the power of the legal system to
compel identification of anonymous posters.
As the Public Citizen Litigation Group states, courts must "develop a
test for the identification of anonymous posters which neither makes it
too easy for vicious defamers to hide behind pseudonyms, nor makes it
too easy for a big company to unmask its critics by the simple device of
filing a complaint which manages to state a valid claim for relief under





The four-part test that Judge MacKenzie adopted in the Dendrite de-
cision, as refined by the Superior Court, goes a long way toward
achieving this balance between employees' speech and privacy rights,
employers' reputational interests, and the necessity of compelling iden-
tity disclosure.
130. Id. at 778.
131. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen and the ACLU of New Jersey at Argument,
Section C Part 2, Dendrite International, Inc v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div., 2001) (No. A-2774-00) at http:lwww.citizen.orgllitigationlbriefs/lstAmendmentl
articles.cfm?ID=1862 (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
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